Changing from paper-based systems to digital mechanisms means that personal information becomes more easily accessible and more difficult to control and secure. When the paper-based practice is in a sector such as healthcare, concerns for patient privacy protection are great.
Patient data privacy in the digital age
In paper-based prescription systems, patients visit their general practitioner (GP) or prescribing nurse or dentist and receive a paper medicinal prescription that the prescriber signs. Generally, patients can take this prescription to any pharmacist in the country for dispensation. This also provides flexibility because they do not have to decide in advance from which pharmacist to collect their medication, nor must they choose a specific time to visit the pharmacist (prescriptions in the UK are valid for six months).
Transitioning from paper-prescribing practices to ETP could change who holds the responsibility of protecting patients' privacy. Patients might no longer solely control their data's privacy while their prescription moves through the ETP system-that control might lie with them, healthcare professionals, or the administrators of a central electronic prescription storage device.
Patient control
Two mechanisms which can help patients protect their own privacy in an ETP system are : patient smartcards, 4 which hold the electronic prescription during transit, and two-dimensional PDF417 barcodes 5 contain a transferable electronic prescription. These mechanisms result in ?? Patients controlling their own data privacy and retaining fle xibility concerning which pharmacist they choose to dispense their prescription.
?? Expensive equipment being required. Lost smartcards would be fairly expensive to replace.
?? Patients failing to obtain their prescription when equipment breaks.
Healthcare professional control
Responsibility for protecting medicinal prescriptions in an ETP system could also reside with healthcare professionals. They are bound by professional and legal statutes from disclosing personal medical information, so having them control patient privacy is safe ethically, but ultimately not as private as when the patient assumes protective responsibility. However, some existing systems do protect medicinal prescriptions through encryption and direct transfer of encrypted prescriptions from the prescriber to the pharmacist or pharmacy. 6 The results are ?? The patients' loss of flexibility because they must predetermine the pharmacist or pharmacy from which they obtain their prescriptions. ?? Complexity in application, for example, the choice of whom to encrypt for (pharmacist, pharmacy, or group of pharmacies) and which public keys to use. ?? Patients cannot get their prescription when equipment fails. ?? Prescriptions remain confidential throughout transit and only the intended pharmacists can view them.
However, if the prescription is encrypted for a group of pharmacists, all of them can read the contents.
Storage device administrator control
Even worse than placing responsibility for the protection of confidential information with healthcare professionals is placing it with storage device administrators, which is the method that some ETP systems use. 7 Prescriptions are securely transferred to a central store via an encrypted transmission session and can only be decrypted using a key known to the central storage device. They are then stored either openly in clear text or in its encrypted form. Finally, when a pharmacist or pharmacy requests them, prescriptions are removed from storage and either decrypted and then re-encrypted for the pharmacist or pharmacy (if stored in encrypted form) or simply re-encrypted for the pharmacist or pharmacy (if stored in the clear). The results are that ?? Prescriptions will be in clear text during the decryption / re-encryption procedure, which could be for the storage's duration. ?? Administrators could obtain the storage device's decryption key, thus rendering all prescriptions readable. Worse, they might have a dummy pharmacist's private key for administrative purposes, giving them access to all prescriptions. ?? Patients retain their flexibility because they don't have to specify a pharmacist, but lose control of their data privacy while prescriptions are in transit. ?? When equipment fa ils, patients cannot obtain their prescribed drugs
The Salford model
After examining the designs that currently protect information privacy, we became concerned that no single method offered a completely ideal solution: one in which the patient retains fle xibility over which pharmacist to go to (and when), controls the privacy of their prescription information while it is in transit, is inexpensive, robust, and not error-prone or susceptible to any technology or equipment failures. In our ETP solution, the Salford model, we combined and improved on existing ETP models' best features.
The Salford model is detailed in an earlier work; 3 we provide an overview of the provision for patient privacy in this article. In the Salford model, responsibility for keeping the electronic prescription private remains with the patient via a symmetric key bar code. The software randomly generates a symmetric key, using it to encrypt the electronic prescription//Au: correct? Yes//. A conventional 1D bar code is then printed on a paper prescription to hold a representation of this key. The prescription is still printed on the paper prescription form, thereby introducing robustness and reliability in case technology fails. The software also prints a second 1D bar code (the identification barcode) onto the paper prescription, which locates the prescription in the central store. Finally, the electronic prescription is transferred by the software to a central store, where it remains in its encrypted form. When the patient wishes to fill the prescription, he or she simply takes the paper prescription containing the symmetric key bar code to their chosen pharmacy, the identification and symmetric key barcodes are scanned by the pharmacist, and the electronic prescription is automatically retrieved from storage and decrypted by the software..
Using a 1D bar code to store a decryption key offers the solution we wanted. Patients keep their flexibility because they can take their prescription to any pharmacy. Any pharmacist can decrypt the prescription held in the central store, providing they have access to the presented barcode. Patients control their prescription information because nobody can decrypt the digital information in the central store without the barcode, which the patient carries. The solution is also inexpensive because 1D scanners are now commonly found in pharmacies. Furthermore, our encoding method (see the next section) means that the pharmacist can manually enter the code if for any reason it becomes unscannable, for example, if the patient damages the paper. Finally, because we continue to print the full prescription on paper, the system is completely resilient to any technology failures.
Bar code implementation
We designed and generated a system for condensing a 128-bit symmetric encryption key into a Code 128 barcode for use in the Salford model. 8 The Code 128 bar code system has a symbology (i.e. expression of information by symbols ) that contains 106 distinct symbols and can conveniently store up to 20 of these in a single barcode. If each of these symbols is regarded as an arithmetic digit, then we can use up to radix 106 (decimal) arithmetic to store integers. In symmetric key encryption, we don't have to use negative numbers so we can restrict the range held to positive integers. Therefore, a single bar code symbol can represent the decimal range 0 to 105, two symbols 0 to 11,235 and so on, using radix base 106. So, we can store a number up to 106 (decimal) to the power of 20 (which is equal to 3.2? 10 40 ) in a single bar code. A 128-bit symmetric binary encryption key (which is equal to 3.4 ? 10 38 ) can therefore easily be represented in this range. To find a key's 20 symbol representation, we use the conventional method of repeatedly dividing the number (the key) by the radix and taking the remainder as a symbol of the converted number.
To transform the barcode to a key, we convert each symbol to an integer. The key is then the sum of each integer weighted by the power of the radix. The conversion processes are carried out in Java using the convenient BigInteger class, which easily carries out the arithmetic on the large integers involved. You can find the Java methods used in the conversion process at http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk/EPP/public/cprocess.pdf.
If we take a pharmacy in the UK , then the number of prescriptions dispensed each day ranges from 50 to 500. In the UK, prescriptions number approximately 300 million per year. Errors in barcode translation are extremely low (1 in 2.8 million in Code 128 symbology 9 ), but this still means that approximately 100 prescriptions a year fail to scan. However, barcodes could be damaged while with the patient, so the total number that fail to scan could be considerably higher. Therefore, we require a textual version of the information the barcode represents so that the pharmacist can unambiguously input the numbers manually in such circumstances. However, a problem exists for the pharmacist with the Code 128 symbologyseveral of the symbols are not English and do not have a single key representation on a standard keyboard, for example, Ÿ, AE, and Ê. The full single key character set on a standard computer keyboard comprises just 94 characters. Some of these are easily confused, for example, O and 0, I and 1, and also ' and ". These symbols are too error-prone to find acceptance by the average pharmacist who tries to key in a damaged barcode. This data-entry character-confusion problem was previously researched, 10 therefore we selected a subset of characters that a user can more easily handle. Our reduced set of characters comprises These 59 symbols form the basis for radix 59 arithmetic. We can then use this number space to represent symmetric keys. We use a 24 -digit number printed in six four-digit groups (59 24 = 3.1? 10 42 ). Figure 1 shows an example of the symmetric key representation.
To help the pharmacist with translation errors, we also made provisions in the 24-character representation for a two -digit checksum. This allows for focused error detection-for example, if the pharmacist incorrectly types in a symbol, the application can detect automatically that an input error occurred. You can view the translation process code from key to user symbol representation and its reverse procedure at http://sec.isi.salford.ac.uk/EPP/public/tprocess.pdf.
Symmetric key user testing
An example Code 128 barcode containing a 128 bit symmetric key with its symbolic representation p rinted below To ensure the symmetric key barcode idea had credence in the real-world, we tested whether the barcode's Figure 1 textual representation was usable. The test consisted of inputting two sets of encoded symmetric keys on the keyboard: one set used the full 94 single keyable characters from the Code 128 character symbology (removing characters such as AE, but keeping ambiguous characters such as zero and nought) and the other using the reduced 59-character set. We tested 10 users, evaluated how long it took them to input each set, and noted their error rate when transferring the textual representation to the computer. The test's other purpose was evaluating whether the reduced set made data entry easier. For this, we evaluated the results and also asked users which test they preferred.
On average, we found that both tests resulted in the test users taking approximately the same amount of time to input a barcode. The actual averages were 30 seconds for the full character set and 31 seconds for the reduced set. Times ranged from 20 to 45 seconds. The reduced character set took slightly longer because using the full character set results in a barcode representation of just 20 characters in length (94 20 = 2.9?10 39 ) whereas the reduced set requires a 24 -character long representation. This led to the 3 percent time increase. The most significant difference between the two barcode sets comes in the error rate when carrying out each test. For the full 94 single key character set, there is an average error rate of 23 percent over the 20-character symmetric key barcodes. For the reduced 59-character set, the error rate is a more respectable 11 percent over the 24 character symmetric key barcode. This is entirely due to the ambiguities in the full single key character set between characters such as zero and nought. When we asked users which set they preferred to input, they categorically stated the reduced character set even though it took them slightly longer to conclude the test. We believe that the preference is because the users must concentrate much harder to input the barcodes from the full 94-character set than for the reduced set of easily recognizable symbols. If we take an average pharmacy dispensing rate of around 100 prescriptions a day, and assume a barcode error rate of 3 percent (which were found in trials with the Portable Data File 417 2D barcodes 5 ), the results are an average barcode failure rate of around three prescriptions a day. When the 1D barcode fails, these results show that it will take pharmacists an average of 31 seconds to key in the representative code, and on average one out of every 10 will result in an input error. This would result in the average pharmacist having to re -input one barcode every four days, which we believe is acceptable given the apparent benefits to patient privacy.
In the Salford model's current design, the prescription still carries the patient data in written form. If a patient loses a prescription or if it is stolen, private data becomes compromised. It would be possible to have total privacy by printing only the 1D barcodes on the prescription and no other identifiable patient data. However, we believe this is less user friendly because patie nts are not sure what they have been prescribed, or if it really is their prescription. They would only know for sure when, at the pharmacy, their electronic prescription is successfully retrieved and decrypted using the 1D barcodes. Furthermore, only having barcode data on prescriptions is not resilient to technological failures. Thus, we believe our design is an acceptable compromise between usability and data privacy. The symmetric algorithm our system uses is a configuration parameter, thus the algorithm is not identified in the 1D barcode. This will make migration to a new algorithm quite difficult. Our system could be enhanced by adding an identifier of the symmetric algorithm to the barcode for use along with the symmetric key. There is plenty of number space left in the barcode to do this easily.
Symmetric key barcode techniques could also be used in other medical applications. For example, medical records could be symmetrically encrypted; patients could grant access to their records by giving healthcare professionals their bar coded medical cards. For hospital emergency rooms, different procedures would need to be in place, with a copy of the symmetric key available to emergency clinicians. Pathology results could also be provided in the same fashion. When patients are tested, they could be given a symmetric key barcode. After the results are made electronic, they would be encrypted with this symmetric key; the patient is the only person who could grant access to those results.
That same concept can be used in any domain in which electronic data is available but which only the data subject has access to, or to any anyone the subject grants access. For example, in a higher-education institution, a central Web server could house encrypted assessment results. A student's identity card could contain a personal symmetric key representation, which they would type in to obtain their decrypted assessment results. This could be extended-students could let prospective employers or family members access an encrypted summary of their results by giving them their symmetric key.
